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A communication protocol is introduced that allows the receiver of a message to place an a poste-
riori bound on the amount of information that an eavesdropper could have obtained during trans-
mission of that message. This quantum cryptographic protocol is distinct from quantum key distri-
bution. The quantum states and measurements required by this protocol are simple enough that it
can be implemented using existing technology.
A major concern when transmitting a secret message
over a public communication channel is that an eaves-
dropper might intercept the message and learn its mean-
ing. This is combatted by encrypting the message so that
an eavesdropper cannot decipher the meaning of the in-
tercepted message.[1, 2] In its most secure form, this re-
lies upon the communicating parties sharing a single-use
private key which is as long as the message.[1] Recently,
great strides have been made at generating and distribut-
ing private keys using quantum mechanical systems sent
through insecure channels.[3] Such quantum key genera-
tion (QKD) protocols have the distinct feature that an
eavesdropper leaves evidence of her activity. However,
due to their design, these QKD protocols do not convey
messages.
In this Letter we introduce a quantum seal protocol,
which is a method for two parties to communicate a mes-
sage, not simply to generate a random key.[4, 5] Its utility
comes from the fact that it allows the receiver to place
an a posteriori bound on the amount of information an
eavesdropper could have obtained over the course of the
transmission. Each time a message is sent, there is a
straightforward way in which an eavesdropper can at-
tempt to intercept the message. Yet if this occurs, the
receiver will be given an unambiguous indication that
there was a disturbance in the system and an eavesdrop-
per may have been tapping into the communication chan-
nel. If there is no eavesdropper and the quantum channel
is relatively noise-free, then the receiver will have confi-
dence that no other parties have read the message.
This protocol can be used to seal up and communicate
an encrypted message, thereby providing an extra layer of
assurance while sending sensitive material, on top of any
sophisticated encryption technique that may currently be
used.
The protocol involves a message sender, named Alice,
trying to get a message bit b (whose values can be zero
or one) to a receiver, called Bob. The entire process
is initiated by Alice announcing that she has a message
she wants to communicate to Bob. Then a routine is
repeated many times. Each repetition is referred to as a
single “shot”, and proceeds as follows.
Bob starts the routine by preparing some physical sys-
TABLE I: Each shot, Alice makes one of the following eight
announcements.
Bit-Announcements Result-Announcements
σ1 c = 0 σ1 m = +1
σ1 c = 1 σ1 m = −1
σ3 c = 0 σ3 m = +1
σ3 c = 1 σ3 m = −1
tem (which we refer to as a particle) in one of four quan-
tum states, represented by density matrices ρ(0) ≡ |0〉〈0|,
ρ(1) ≡ |1〉〈1|, ρ(+) ≡ |+〉〈+|, or ρ(−) ≡ |−〉〈−|. (Here
we have used the standard notation for a qubit Hilbert
space that is spanned by basis vectors |0〉 and |1〉 and
|±〉 ≡ 2−
1
2 [|0〉±|1〉].) Bob employs a randomized method
of preparation so that he is equally likely to prepare the
particle in any of these four states. Bob records which
state he has prepared and sends the particle to Alice.
Upon receipt of the particle, Alice makes one of two
measurements: with probability one-half she makes a
measurement corresponding to σ1 ≡ |+〉〈+| − |−〉〈−|,
and with probability one-half she makes a measurement
corresponding to σ3 ≡ |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. Alice records her
measurement result as m (which will be +1 or −1) and
announces whether her measurement corresponded to σ1
or σ3.
Then Alice makes a second announcement. With prob-
ability pa she announces the classical bit c which is de-
termined from the message bit b and the measurement
result m using
c =
(
b+
1−m
2
)
mod 2 , (1)
which we refer to as a bit-announcement. Or else, (with
probability [1−pa]) she announces the value of m, which
we refer to as a result-announcement. This completes the
routine for a single shot.
Each time that Alice makes a bit-announcement Bob
has a chance to determine the value of b, provided that he
has prepared the particle in an eigenstate of the measure-
ment operator corresponding to the measurement that
2Alice performs. In such a case, Bob uses his conjectured
value of m (based on his knowledge of the state he pre-
pared and his knowledge of the measurement made by
Alice) along with the equation
b =
(
c+
1−m
2
)
mod 2 (2)
to determine the value of b. Bob can only do this
when the state in which he prepares the particle and
the measurement that Alice performs have a “matching
basis,” which occurs with probability pa/2. If a bit-
announcement is made on a shot when Alice and Bob
do not have a matching basis then Bob will not know
which value of m to use in order to calculate the value
of b. Similarly, since every outside observer lacks Bob’s
knowledge of the state in which he prepared the particle,
both values of m are equally likely (for either measure-
ment). An eavesdropper who is simply listening to the
announcements made by Alice will not be able to deter-
mine the value of the message bit b. (The analysis below
provides a rigorous method to support this last heuristic
statement.)
In order to have a good chance that their bases will be
matched up at least once on a bit-announcement, Bob
and Alice will repeat this routine N times, where the
value of N can be chosen in the following way. They set
some target confidence level Cm, where 0 < Cm < 1,
and choose N so that the probability of matching bases
during a bit-announcement will be at least Cm. This
leads to the value of N which is the next integer greater
than log(1−Cm)/ log(1− pa/2). (This ignores the likeli-
hood that some of the particles will not reach Alice due
to imperfections in the quantum channel. This can be
thought of as a “null” announcement by Alice and simply
increases the number of shots that Bob needs to initiate
in order to reach the target confidence level.)
Each time that Alice makes a result-announcement it
gives Bob an opportunity to test the quantum channel for
noise (which may be due to imperfections in the system or
an eavesdropper). Since Bob knows the state in which he
prepared the particle (for each shot), a statistical analysis
of the measurement results allows him to determine if the
state of the particle is being changed after it leaves him
but before it is measured by Alice.
Bob expects to have (1− pa)N , opportunities to check
the measurement results; as pa becomes very small, this
grows as − log(1−Cm)[2/pa − 5/2+ 11pa/24 +O(pa)
2].
(Using the value of N determined earlier.) On the other
hand, the number of bit-announcements (each of which
provides an opportunity for an eavesdropper, called Eve,
to gain knowledge of b) is expected to be paN ; as pa
becomes very small, this only goes like − log(1−Cm)[2−
pa/2− O(pa)
2]. Of course, Alice and Bob are free to set
pa as close to zero as they wish. As they decrease pa, N
will increase, and the number of opportunities they get
to characterize the channel will increase, but the number
of opportunities that Eve expects to get to obtain the
message will not increase beyond −2 log(1− Cm).
Now that we have given a description of this protocol,
two parts remain to the analysis: First, to describe pos-
sible eavesdropping strategies and quantify the amount
of information Eve expects to gain from her actions. Sec-
ond, to show how Bob can place a bound on the Eve’s
expected information from his statistical error analysis.
Due to the fact that Bob has a 1/4 chance to produce
any of the four possible initial states ρ(0), ρ(1), ρ(+), and
ρ(−), Eve’s best description of the initial state of the par-
ticle — on every shot — is ρ = 12I, where I is the identity
operator. An eavesdropper’s goal is to choose her actions
so that her description of the state of the particle is im-
proved. This will lead to a better prediction of Alice’s
measurement results which will in turn allow her to de-
duce the message from Alice’s announcements.
On each shot, an eavesdropper has only two options:
either apply a quantum operation E to the particle or
perform a measurement (POVM) M on the particle. Ei-
ther option will generally change the state of the particle
(according to Eve’s description). A quantum operation
is described by a set of operators {E1, E2, . . . , Er} with
the constraint
∑
i E
†
iEi = I. When applying a quantum
operation to a particle described by the state ρ, the fi-
nal state is described by ρ′ =
∑
i EiρE
†
i . Similarly, a
measurement with d possible outcomes is described by a
set of operators {F1, F2, . . . , Fd} subject to the constraint∑
i F
†
i Fi = I. When the measurement is performed on
the particle described by state ρ and the outcome i is
found, the state after the measurement is then described
by ρ′ = FiρF
†
i /Tr(FiρF
†
i ). Generally, we describe the
mapping Π from the initial state of the particle ρ to its
final state Π(ρ) = ρ′ as the effective-evolution of the state
of the particle on that shot.
Over the course of the N shots, we describe
the effective-evolution string of length N as S =
(Π1,Π2, . . . ,ΠN ) where Πi is the effective-evolution
which occurred on the ith shot. It can be shown that for
the qubit case at hand, the set of all possible effective-
evolution strings of length N is a compact set.
Generally, the particular effective-evolution that oc-
curs on a given shot is decided randomly. (Especially in
the case when an effective-evolution occurs as a result
of measurement.) Therefore, the a priori description of
an eavesdropper’s effect on the state of the particle will
be through a set of possible effective-evolution strings
of length N , along with the probability Pr(Si) that the
string Si will be the one that occurs.
To describe how much of the message an eavesdrop-
per expects to obtain by imposing a particular effective-
evolution string on the particle, we use the mutual infor-
mation between the random variable B describing all the
possible messages and the random variable A describing
all the possible announcement strings.
3TABLE II: The probability for the eight possible announce-
ments given a particular value for b and given that an eaves-
dropper causes the state to change from ρ to ρ′ = Π(ρ). For
Eve, the initial state is always described by ρ = 1
2
I whereas
Bob’s description of the initial state is based upon his knowl-
edge of the particular pure state he prepared on that shot.
Pr(σ1, c=0|Π, ρ, b) =
pa
4
[1 + (1− 2b)Tr(σ1ρ
′)]
Pr(σ1, c=1|Π, ρ, b) =
pa
4
[1− (1− 2b)Tr(σ1ρ
′)]
Pr(σ3, c=0|Π, ρ, b) =
pa
4
[1 + (1− 2b)Tr(σ3ρ
′)]
Pr(σ3, c=1|Π, ρ, b) =
pa
4
[1− (1− 2b)Tr(σ3ρ
′)]
Pr(σ1,m=+1|Π, ρ, b) =
1−pa
4
[1 + Tr(σ1ρ
′)]
Pr(σ1,m=−1|Π, ρ, b) =
1−pa
4
[1− Tr(σ1ρ
′)]
Pr(σ3,m=+1|Π, ρ, b) =
1−pa
4
[1 + Tr(σ3ρ
′)]
Pr(σ3,m=−1|Π, ρ, b) =
1−pa
4
[1− Tr(σ3ρ
′)]
The possible messages are b= 0 and b= 1, both with
a priori probability one-half.
There are 8N possible announcement strings, which
comes from the eight possible announcements (shown
in Table I) for each of the N shots. The probabil-
ity Pr(a|b,S) that Alice makes the announcement-string
a = (a1, . . . , aN ) given a particular value of b and given
that Eve’s actions result in the effective-evolution string
S = (Π1, . . . ,ΠN ) is
Pr(a|b,S) =
N∏
i=1
Pr(ai|b,Πi) . (3)
The probabilities for the eight different announcements
on each shot are shown in Table II.
The mutual information IS(A : B) between ran-
dom variables A and B describes the amount of knowl-
edge (on average) Eve expects to gain about the mes-
sage from Alice’s announcements when she imposes
the effective-evolution string S. It is calculated by
IS(A : B) =
1∑
b=0
Pr(b)
∑
a(N)
Pr(a|b,S) log Pr(a|b,S)
−
∑
a(N)
Pr(a|S) log Pr(a|S) (4)
where the sum over a(N) indicates that the sum is taken
over possible announcement strings of length N , and
where Pr(a|S) = 12 [Pr(a|b=0,S) + Pr(a|b=1,S)].
Each possible announcement string a can be “split-
up” into x, the string of the bit-announcements in a,
and y, the string of the result-announcements in a. The
probability Pr(a|b,S) can be written as
Pr(a|b,S) = Pr(x|b, T ) Pr(y|b,U) , (5)
where T is the effective-evolution string for the shots
when bit-announcements are made and where U is
the effective-evolution string for the shots when result-
announcements are made.
Because of the probabilistic nature of the protocol, the
number of bit-announcements is not fixed. The probabil-
ity Pr(k) that Alice makes k bit-announcements can be
calculated using the binomial distribution:
Pr(k) =
N !
k!(N − k)!
pka(1− pa)
(N−k) ,
where k = 0, 1, . . . , N . In other words, this is the prob-
ability that the string x will have length k. The k bit-
announcements can be distributed among the N shots
in
(
N
k
)
= N !
k!(N−k)! different ways. Since Eve does not
know before-hand which shots will correspond to bit-
announcements, when calculating the mutual informa-
tion she must take into account that T can be chosen in(
N
k
)
ways from the effective-evolutions in S.
Utilizing these results, we rewrite Equation (4) as
IS(A : B) =
1∑
b=0
1
2
∑
k
Pr(k)
∑
T (k)
1(
N
k
) ∑
x(k)
∑
y(N−k)
Pr(x|b, T ) Pr(y|b,U) log [Pr(x|b, T ) Pr(y|b,U)]
−
∑
k
Pr(k)
∑
T (k)
1(
N
k
) ∑
x(k)
∑
y(N−k)
Pr(x|T ) Pr(y|U) log [Pr(x|T ) Pr(y|U)] (6)
where the sum over x(k) (y(N−k)) indicates that the
sum is taken over possible bit-announcement (result-
announcement) strings of length k (respectively, [N − k])
and where the sum over T (k) indicates that this
sum is taken over all possible ways in which the
effective-evolution string of length k (corresponding to
bit-announcements) can be chosen from the effective-
evolution string S. The effective-evolution string U is the
resulting effective-evolution string of length N − k when
the string T is “plucked-out” of the string S. Because the
result-announcements have no dependence on the mes-
sage, neither do the result-announcement strings. That
4is,
Pr(y|b=0,U) = Pr(y|b=1,U) = Pr(y|U) ,
for every U . It is straightforward to show that this results
in a great simplification of Equation (6) to
IS(A : B) =∑
k
Pr(k)(
N
k
) ∑
T (k)
[
1
2
1∑
b=0
∑
x(k)
Pr(x|b, T ) log Pr(x|b, T )
−
∑
x(k)
Pr(x|T ) log Pr(x|T )
]
. (7)
This leads to the natural introduction of N + 1 new
random variables, X(k) for k = 0, 1, . . . , N , where X(k)
describes the possible bit-announcement strings of length
k. We can now rewrite Equation (7) as
IS(A : B) =
N∑
k=0
pka(1 − pa)
(N−k)
∑
T (k)
IT (X
(k) : B) . (8)
This completes the analysis of the amount of information
that an eavesdropper expects to gain about the message
when her eavesdropping activity induces the effective-
evolution string S.
It is worthwhile mentioning here that using Eqs. (8)
and (3) we can now provide quantitative support for our
earlier comment about the ignorance of an eavesdrop-
per who is listening to Alice’s announcements but not
interacting with the particle in any way. In this case,
the effective-evolution mapping Π is the identity map-
ping on every shot. Therefore, it is straightforward to
show that IS(A : B) = 0 because the probabilities for
the bit-announcements (shown in Table II) do not de-
pend on b.
After the N shots are performed, Alice will have made
a specific string of announcements â, which corresponds
to specific strings of bit-announcements x̂ (of length k̂)
and result-announcements ŷ. For each of the announce-
ments âi, Bob knows the state ρi in which he prepared the
particle. As discussed earlier, he uses this knowledge of
the initial states, along with the k̂ bit-announcements x̂α
for α = 1, . . . , k̂ to determine the message. We will now
describe how he uses Alice’s N− k̂ result-announcements
ŷβ for β = 1, . . . , (N− k̂) along with his knowledge of the
corresponding initial states ρβ for β = 1, . . . , (N − k̂) to
determine the likelihood that the message was exposed to
an eavesdropper. We describe this string of initial states
by ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN−k̂), which corresponds to the shots
where Alice makes result-announcements.
Given an effective-evolution string S that Eve in-
duces by her actions, k̂ of these actions will have oc-
curred on shots when Alice makes a bit-announcement
and N − k̂ occurred on shots when Alice makes a
result-announcement. We can calculate Pr(ŷ|S,ρ) the
probability (from Bob’s point of view) of Alice making
the result-announcements ŷ given the effective-evolution
string S induced by Eve’s actions. To do this, we use the
string U = {Π1, . . . ,ΠN−k̂} of effective evolutions in S
that occurred during shots when a result-announcement
was made. This probability is determined using
Pr(ŷ|S,ρ) =
N−k̂∏
i=1
Pr(ai|Πi, ρi) . (9)
We now form a set of effective-evolution strings Σ(ε) such
that S is an element of Σ(ε) if Pr(ŷ|S,ρ) > ε for some
number 0 < ε < 1. That is, we include an effective-
evolution string in the set Σ(ε) if there is a substantial
probability, based upon the result-announcement data,
that that effective-evolution string was induced by an
eavesdropper.
We define the exposure IE(ε) of the message to be
IE(ε) = max
S∈Σ(ε)
1(
N
k
) ∑
T (̂k)
IT (X
(̂k) : B). (10)
This maximum is known to exist because Σ(ε) is a com-
pact set. This completes the analysis describing how the
receiver sets a bound on the amount of a message exposed
to any eavesdroppers.
While using this protocol to transmit messages, if some
messages have been transmitted with no exposure to
eavesdroppers, these messages could be used as crypto-
keys for subsequent communication. Finally, we remark
that the states and measurements described here are
identical to those used in the BB84 protocol,[6] and any
apparatus that is designed to implement BB84 can also
implement this protocol with minor modifications.
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